I forgot, I finished Moneyball last weekend and I really enjoyed it. The timing of reading this now (it chronicles the 2002 season for the Oakland A's) is interesting, because many of Billy Beane's draft picks are now in the bigs. (Such as Nick Swisher and Jeremy Bonderman. That Bonderman trade didn't work out too well for Oakland.)
Being both a fan of baseball and a math nerd, it's fascinating to see the two collide. Weaned on baseball conventional wisdom, some of the theories are hard to swallow. While not stealing bases and not bunting work in the American League, where you have nine batters in the lineup, I'm not sure they translate as well to the National League, where the pitchers hit. (The teams using the "sabremetric" approach are all in the AL - Oakland, Toronto, and Boston. Worked out pretty well for Boston in 2004.) If the pitcher is up with a runner at first, I would think the statistical likelihood of an unproductive out (pop-up, strikeout, or, worse, double play) is much higher than that of a hit, so a sacrifice bunt is the right call.
Also, sacrifice bunting reduces the expected number of runs your team will score. But in the bottom of the ninth in a tie game, you only need one run to win. Sacrificing the runner means you only have about a fifty percent chance of getting the run home from second with one out. But even a very good hitter (.350 average) is going to get a hit, making getting a run likely, only 35% of the time. 65% of the time, the runner will advance to second anyway, have to stay at first, or get wiped out completely on a double play. I think you bunt there too, especially if you have a weak hitter up there.
Still, it makes for good conversation and a fun read. The chapter where Billy is making trades at the deadline is amazing. But I'd stop short of calling him a genius. Visionary, yes; but not genius. The A's are highly successful, especially given their pitiful payroll, but that's mostly because 29 of the 32 teams are still doing things old-school. If the other teams changed their scouting and the way they evaluate players, it would be harder for Billy to snatch up players that fit his mold. Boston won because they had the right makeup of talent statistically, but they also went out and got the best players. Oakland can't even afford to retain the players they have, much less get the best ones for their system. If everyone wanted players like Kevin Youkilis, instead of just Oakland and Boston, Oakland wouldn't be able to afford him.
The Moneyball system allows them to compete over a 162-game schedule because the sample size of a baseball season is huge. I don't think such a system would be viable in a sport like football, which has a much shorter season. It's possible the A's lose in the playoffs (5 and 7 game series) because their teams are, metaphorically speaking, built for a marathon and not a sprint. The sample size is much smaller, and formulas meant to project long-term performance might not be effective in short series.
Bottom line, good read. I always feel a sense of accomplishment when I finish a book, or when I complete a video game. Notice how you never feel that way when you watch TV?
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